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Previous research showed that decisions to act (i.e., actions) produce more regret than decisions not to
act (i.e., inactions). This previous research focused on decisions made in isolation and ignored that
decisions are often made in response to earlier outcomes. The authors show in 4 experiments that these
prior outcomes may promote action and hence make inaction more abnormal. They manipulated
information about a prior outcome. As hypothesized, when prior outcomes were positive or absent,
people attributed more regret to action than to inaction. However, as predicted and counter to previous
research, following negative prior outcomes, more regret was attributed to inaction, a finding that the
authors label the inaction effect. Experiment 4, showing differential effects for regret and disappointment,
demonstrates the need for emotion-specific predictions.
Sometimes when confronted with a bad decision outcome, peo-
ple blame themselves and realize that if only they had acted
differently, this outcome would have been better. This unpleasant
feeling, experienced when people look back on bad decisions, is
the emotion of regret. Regret is a common experience, well known
to most, if not all, of us. A study of verbal expressions of emotions
in everyday conversation revealed that regret was the second most
frequently named emotion (only love was mentioned more fre-
quently; Shimanoff, 1984). But regret is not only experienced
often; it also has serious behavioral implications, stemming from
both the anticipation and the experience of this emotion (for
reviews, see Landman, 1993; Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg, In-
man, & Pieters, 2001). Given its frequent occurrence and its
potentially strong implications for our day-to-day behavior, it is
important to develop our insights into the psychology of regret.
One of the central issues in current regret research concerns the
question of whether people regret the actions they have taken more
than the actions they have foregone (i.e., inactions). Because of the
large number of studies showing that outcomes achieved through
action lead to more regret than do the same outcomes achieved
through inaction (e.g., Baron & Ritov, 1994; Connolly, Ordo ´n ˜ez,
& Coughlan, 1997; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994, 1995; Gilovich,
Medvec, & Chen, 1995; Gleicher et al., 1990; Kahneman &
Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987; Miller & Taylor, 1995; N’gbala &
Branscombe, 1997; Ordo ´n ˜ez & Connolly, 2000; Ritov & Baron,
1995; Zeelenberg, Van der Pligt, & Manstead, 1998; Zeelenberg,
Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998, 2000), Gilovich and Medvec (1995)
nominated this as “the clearest and most frequently replicated
finding” (p. 380) in this domain. In the remainder of this article we
refer to this phenomenon as the action effect.
1
In the present article we try to enhance the understanding of the
psychology of regret by focusing on the antecedents of the action
effect. Previous regret research has largely ignored the fact that
decisions are often made in response to outcomes, experiences, or
events that occurred earlier. We find this unfortunate because the
presence of these prior outcomes, experiences, or events may be
very typical in everyday life and may have considerable impact on
the regret experienced over current decision outcomes. In what
follows, we reason that when prior outcomes are negative, people
may feel inclined to take action to improve future outcomes, which
may make action more normal than inaction. As a consequence of
this hypothesized psychological process, people may regret inac-
tion more than action, an effect that we label the inaction effect.
It is important to note the differences between our approach and
that of Gilovich and Medvec (1994, 1995). Gilovich and Medvec
also found instances in which inactions were regretted more than
actions. However, these authors studied the temporal pattern of
regret and showed the existence of an inaction effect for long-term
regrets: When looking back, people experience most regret over
the paths not taken. Hence, Gilovich and Medvec argued that, over
time, a number of psychological processes decrease the regret of
actions taken and bolster the regret of actions forgone. Kahneman
1 This research finding has also been referred to as emotional amplifi-
cation (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), the actor effect (Landman, 1987), and
omission bias (Ritov & Baron, 1990). Note that not all research on
action/inaction differences focuses on emotional reactions following out-
comes. The term omission bias has also been used to refer to action/
inaction differences in morality and intention (e.g., Baron & Ritov, 1994;
Kordes-de Vaal, 1996; Ritov & Baron, 1990, 1992, 1995; Spranca, Minsk,
& Baron, 1991).
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314(1995) argued that the short-term and long-term regrets that Gilo-
vich and Medvec investigated were actually two different types of
regret: hot regret, which is the direct emotional reaction to the
outcome, and wistful regret, which is the less intense emotion
“associated with pleasantly sad fantasies of what might have been”
(p. 391). In a recent publication, Gilovich, Medvec, and Kahneman
(1998) agreed on the existence of hot and wistful regret, thereby
restating the fact that, ceteris paribus, actions produce more hot
regrets than do inactions. Our present studies show the contrary.
That is, we show that in some situations inactions lead to more hot
regret than do actions. In doing so, our research stays close to
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) original action effect research
and its follow-ups. First, however, we have to introduce the action
effect, because this effect is the starting point of our investigation.
The Action Effect
We can most easily illustrate the action effect by citing Kahne-
man and Tversky’s (1982) first demonstration of it. These authors
confronted participants with the following scenario:
Paul owns shares in company A. During the past year he considered
switching to stock in company B, but he decided against it. He now
finds out that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had
switched to the stock of company B. George owned shares in company
B. During the past year he switched to stock in company A.H en o w
finds out that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had kept
his stock in Company B. Who feels more regret? (p. 173)
A large majority of the participants indicated more regret for
George, who acted, than for Paul, who decided not to act. Kahne-
man and Tversky (1982) explained their finding by arguing that
actions result in more regret because inactions are more normal
than action. That is, they argued that it is easier to undo the
outcome by mentally mutating an abnormal cause (i.e., action) into
a normal cause (i.e., inaction) than the reverse, and because affec-
tive reactions to outcomes are enhanced when actual outcomes can
easily be imagined otherwise, actions result in stronger regret than
inactions do.
With this example, Kahneman and Tversky (1982) convincingly
illustrated their reasoning that the normality of an outcome has
consequences for the affective reaction to that outcome. However,
consequently, researchers may have overgeneralized the implica-
tions of this demonstration, interpreting it as if it shows that action
always produces more regret than inaction. In contrast, we pursue
and extend the original line of reasoning proposed by Kahneman
and Tversky. That is, by showing the existence of an inaction
effect, we aim to extend their ideas to situations in which prior
outcomes are known. This is important because these situations are
omnipresent and may resemble everyday life more than do situa-
tions in which there are no prior outcomes whatsoever. Moreover,
by adopting a social–psychological perspective on the action ef-
fect, we aim to show that inactions may not always be more normal
than actions but sometimes are more abnormal than actions.
Thus, a question we address in the present article is whether
actions are as abnormal as is suggested by the robustness of the
action effect (see also N’gbala & Branscombe, 1997). We argue
they are not. We reason that actions are only abnormal when there
are no strong reasons to act, as is the case in situations studied thus
far, such as in Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) original scenario.
Furthermore, we argue that when prior outcomes call for action,
inaction is more abnormal than action.
The Impact of Prior Outcomes
The current interpretation of the action effect is that actions are
often more abnormal than inactions are. As we have already noted,
however, we feel that there may be many situations that clearly call
for action. In fact, the supposition that actions are more abnormal
than inactions seems to be contradicted by game-theoretical re-
search showing that people often base their decisions on a simple
win stay–lose change heuristic (e.g., Macy, 1995). Likewise, re-
search in consumer psychology often shows that people only take
action when a prior experience was negative. For example, in their
study on brand switching, Tellis and Geath (1990) demonstrated
that consumers primarily switch brands after a negative experi-
ence; after positive or neutral experiences consumers tend to
remain inactive and stick to their chosen brand. Furthermore,
indirect support for this reasoning comes from the colloquial
expressions that one should never change a winning team and that
if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. These sayings suggest that one’s
decision to take action or not might be based on earlier outcomes.
The sayings also imply that action should follow a negative prior
outcome or event: Fix it when it is broken, and change a losing
team.
Taken together, the above leads us to propose that negative prior
outcomes can induce a tendency to act and, consequently, make
action more normal than inaction. If so, this would imply that in
the case in which negative prior outcomes demand action to be
taken, an inaction effect should be found; that is, actions foregone
are regretted more than actions taken. Thus, if after experiencing a
negative outcome, one does not take action to prevent further
losses, one would feel intense regret if these losses do occur (e.g.,
asking oneself, “Why didn’t I do anything?”). However, if one did
take action to prevent further losses but was unsuccessful, the
regret will be less intense (e.g., saying to oneself, “At least I
tried!”).
It would be important for our understanding of the psychology
of regret if we could provide supportive evidence for this line of
reasoning. As we argue above, everyday decisions are rarely made
in isolation. The above-mentioned examples also suggest that
people’s emotional reactions to the outcomes of these decisions
may be influenced by prior outcomes, which might have implica-
tions for the action/inaction differences found in previous research.
We are not aware of any research investigating the influence of
prior outcomes on regret following current actions and inactions.
Regret and Responsibility
An important element in our reasoning is that people feel more
responsible for abnormal outcomes and that responsibility for
current outcomes is one of the primary causes of regret. According
to regret theory (e.g., Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982), regret
is a counterfactual emotion that stems from a comparison between
what is and what might have been. However, not every “might
have been” is supposed to produce regret. Regret is assumed to
originate from comparisons between a factual outcome and an
outcome that might have been had one chosen another action.
Because one could have prevented the occurrence of the negative
315 THE INACTION EFFECToutcome by choosing something different, regret is related to a
sense of responsibility for the outcome. Sugden (1985) was among
the first to make this link explicit. In his view, regret stems both
from realizing that an alternative course of action would have been
better and from blaming oneself for the original decision. More-
over, according to Sugden, regret arising from self-recrimination
or self-blame is most pronounced when one’s decision was unrea-
sonable, inexplicable, or indefensible. This can be interpreted as
another way of saying that regret is more extreme the more
abnormal the decision was.
The role of responsibility in regret was supported in a recent set
of experiments (see, Connolly et al., 1997; Ordo ´n ˜ez & Connolly,
2000; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998, 2000). In these
experiments, using a scenario methodology similar to one used in
action effect research, researchers manipulated responsibility to
investigate its effects on regret. The conclusion of these experi-
ments was that although regret in rare cases may be experienced in
absence of responsibility, the typical regret experience clearly
involves a feeling of responsibility. This is consistent with Frijda,
Kuipers, and Ter Schure (1989), who found that regret is closely
related to the appraisal of self-agency. This link between regret and
responsibility may help to explain why Gilovich and Medvec
(1994, Study 4), in a study of everyday regrets, found so few
regrets concerning negative outcomes that had been imposed on
people. These researchers asked people to recall their biggest
regrets. Less than 5% of these regrets involved outcomes caused
by circumstances beyond the regretter’s control.
The action effect seems to be congruent with the postulated
relation between responsibility and regret. Earlier research showed
that people who cause harm by acting are judged to be more
immoral and more personally responsible than are people who
cause the same harm by not acting (Ritov & Baron, 1990; Spranca,
Minsk, & Baron, 1991). It has also been shown that actions,
compared with inactions, are more salient, are more often used to
infer one’s own and others’ attitude, and are perceived to be more
informative (Fazio, Sherman, & Herr, 1982). Together, these re-
search findings suggest that the relation between a decision maker
and a decision outcome is stronger for actions than for inactions
because of the salience of the decision maker as a causal agent in
the case of action. As Kahneman and Miller (1986) put it, “The
findings that acts of commission produce greater regret than acts of
omission . . . is in accord with formulations that distinguish omis-
sion from commission in attributions of causality and responsibil-
ity” (p. 145).
In summary, we argue for a mediating role of responsibility in
action and inaction effects, and we propose that people experience
regret over negative outcomes for which they feel responsible.
More specifically, we propose that people feel responsible for
outcomes that stem from actions taken when there were no strong
reasons to act. Hence, if these actions result in bad outcomes,
regret is amplified. However, we also argue that negative prior
outcomes can provide reasons for action, which in terms of norm
theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982)
could be interpreted as showing that actions can sometimes be
more abnormal than inactions. In these cases, people feel more
responsible for negative outcomes when they are produced by a
failure to act than when they are produced by an action. Conse-
quently, in these cases, peoples’ regret following inaction is
amplified.
Overview of the Present Studies
In this article we test these ideas in a series of experiments that
include all the important features present in Kahneman and Tver-
sky’s (1982) original scenario: “The consequences [of action and
inaction] are precisely known and precisely matched, the regretted
outcome is recent, and the emotion may be fairly intense” (cf.
Kahneman, 1995, p. 389). Furthermore, we investigate our predic-
tions using scenarios from a domain that is appealing to our
participant population, namely, soccer coach decisions.
2
Experiment 1 investigates the occurrence of the inaction effect;
that is, whether inaction promotes more regret than does action in
the case of negative prior outcomes. The hypothesized mediating
role of responsibility in action and inaction effect is tested for in
Experiment 2. In Experiment 3, we explore the boundary condi-
tions under which our analysis of the inaction effect does not hold.
Although our main interest is to demonstrate the inaction effect in
regret, it may be useful to investigate the action/inaction effect in
related emotions, such as disappointment. Differential effects on
different emotions call for a need to be specific in theoretical as
well as measurement issues (cf. DeSteno, Petty, Wegener, &
Rucker, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, &
Manstead, 1998). Therefore, Experiment 4 investigates whether
the inaction effect is specific for regret or also generalizes to other
emotions, such as disappointment.
Experiment 1: The Inaction Effect
Experiment 1 tests whether an inaction effect occurs when prior
outcomes were negative. To achieve this, we manipulated out-
comes that occurred before the regretted decision by having par-
ticipants read a scenario in which soccer coaches either won or lost
a match prior to the current one. The experiment also included a
control condition in which prior outcomes were absent and in
which the findings of previous studies should be replicated (show-
ing an action effect). In the prior-outcome-positive condition, an
action effect should also be found. This may be seen as an instance
of the never change a winning team heuristic. Hence, when in
response to a positive prior outcome a decision maker decides to
take action and this action produces a negative outcome, the regret
should be especially painful. This may result in an even larger
action effect. In contrast, we also predicted that the prior-outcome-
negative condition would result in an inaction effect. After a
negative outcome, one should try to prevent the same thing from
happening again by taking some sort of action. The regret one feels
when the action results in another negative outcome should be less
severe than the regret one feels when such a repeated negative
outcome stems from inaction.
Method
One hundred sixty-five students (of whom 54 were men and 111 were
women) at Leiden University, Leiden, the Netherlands, participated vol-
untarily and were paid for their participation. They were randomly assigned
to one of three conditions (prior outcome: positive, absent, or negative). All
2 Soccer is by far the most popular sport in the Netherlands. Important
games are broadcast nationwide on television and attract the attention of
the majority of potential viewers.
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Steenland and Straathof, each in charge of a different soccer team. Partic-
ipants in the prior-outcome-negative condition read the following scenario:
Steenland and Straathof are both coach of a soccer team. Steenland is
the coach of Blue-Black, and Straathof is the coach of E.D.O. Both
coaches lost the prior game with a score of 4–0. This Sunday
Steenland decides to do something: He fields three new players.
Straathof decides not to change his team. This time both teams lose
with 3–0. Who feels more regret, coach Steenland or coach Straathof?
In the prior-outcome-positive condition, participants learned that both
teams had won their previous match with a score of 4–0. In the prior-
outcome-absent condition, no information about prior outcomes was given.
Results
The results are presented in Table 1.
3 As a replication of earlier
research, an action effect was found for the prior-outcome-absent
condition, 
2(1, N  55)  13.26, p  .05. Participants indicated
that Coach Steenland (action) would feel more regret than Coach
Straathof (inaction) would. This effect was also present in the
prior-outcome-positive condition, 
2(1, N  55)  36.82, p  .05,
and a direct comparison of these conditions showed that the effect
was even more pronounced than in the prior-outcome-absent con-
dition, 
2(1, N  110)  4.07, p  .05. In the prior-outcome-
negative condition, however, the effect was reversed. Participants
reported that Coach Straathof (inaction) would feel more regret
than would Coach Steenland (action), 
2(1, N  55)  6.56, p 
.05. This condition differed significantly from the other two, 
2s(1,
Ns  110)  19, ps  .05.
Discussion
The results clearly show the action effect when prior outcomes
were unknown or positive. However, as predicted, the action effect
did not occur when prior outcomes were negative. In fact, in this
case the pattern reversed: The regret data show evidence for an
inaction effect. This corroborates our line of thought that prior
negative outcomes may provide a reason to act and thus make
actions more normal and inactions more abnormal. As a conse-
quence, decisions not to act that are followed by a negative
outcome result in more regret than do decisions to act that lead to
identical outcomes.
Experiment 2: On the Role of Responsibility
As we mentioned in the introduction, a central element of our
line of reasoning is that the action effect is related to perceived
responsibility for the outcome. In Experiment 1, however, we did
not assess perceptions of responsibility. This information about
perceived responsibility would provide insight into the process
that, as we assumed, underlies our findings. We developed Exper-
iment 2 for this purpose.
In Experiment 2 we aim to make the following extensions. First,
we included a measure of perceived responsibility to test whether
the manipulation of action/inaction and prior outcome indeed
influenced the responsibility for the outcome. Second, in addition
to the regret questions used in Experiment 1 (the dichotomous
question about who feels more regret, the active or passive actor—
similar to the question used by Kahneman and Tversky, 1982), we
also asked participants to indicate on 7-point scales the intensity of
regret for both the active and the passive actor. These two new
questions enable us to investigate the relation between responsi-
bility and regret using the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach.
More specifically, we expected that the effects of action/inaction
and prior outcomes on regret would be mediated by perceptions of
responsibility.
Method
Seventy-five students (44 women, 31 men) at Leiden University partic-
ipated voluntarily and were paid for their participation. The design, mate-
rials, and procedure were similar to those in Experiment 1. After reading
the scenario, participants were asked the following questions in the order
described here. They were first asked questions concerning perceived
responsibility for the outcomes: “To what extent is Steenland [Straathof]
responsible for the defeat?” Both questions could be answered on 7-point
scales, with higher scores indicating more responsibility for the outcome
(1  very little,7 very much). Participants were also asked to indicate
the level of regret for both actors by means of the following question:
“How much would Steenland [Straathof] regret his decision?” These
questions were to be answered on 7-point scales, with higher scores
indicating more regret (1  very little,7 very much). Finally, they were
asked the dichotomous question “Who feels more regret (Steenland or
Straathof)?”
Results
Responsibility. The responsibility data (see Table 2) were sub-
mitted to a 3 (prior outcome: positive vs. absent vs. negative)  2
(decision: action vs. inaction) analysis of variance (ANOVA), with
decision as a within-subject factor. This analysis yielded only a
3 To facilitate the comparison of the different experiments, Table 1 also
reports the replications of the results of Experiment 1 in Experiments 2
and 4.
Table 1
Participants Reporting More Regret for Action








Action (Coach Steenland) 50 41 18
Inaction (Coach Straathof) 5 14 37
Experiment 2
Action (Coach Steenland) 24 19 4
Inaction (Coach Straathof) 1 6 21
Experiment 4
Action (Coach Steenland) 44 41 18
Inaction (Coach Straathof) 6 9 32
Overall
Action (Coach Steenland)
%9 1 7 8 3 1
n 118 101 40
Inaction (Coach Straathof)
% 9 22 69
n 12 29 90
317 THE INACTION EFFECTsignificant Prior Outcome  Decision interaction, F(2, 72) 
29.65, p  .05.
Comparisions of the relevant means showed that prior-outcome-
positive participants indicated that the active coach was judged as
being more responsible than the passive coach, F(1, 72)  38.72,
p  .05. In the prior-outcome-absent condition, they were judged
equally responsible, F(1, 72)  1. As predicted, in the prior-
outcome-negative condition, the active coach was judged to be less
responsible than the inactive coach F(1, 72)  52.02, p  .05.
These results show that manipulations of decision and prior out-
comes influenced perceived responsibility for the current
outcomes.
Regret. Participants were asked to indicate the levels of regret
for both the active and the passive coach. The results, presented in
Table 2, show the same pattern as the responsibility data addressed
above. A 3 (prior outcome: positive vs. absent vs. negative) 
(decision: action vs. inaction) ANOVA, with decision as a within-
subject factor, revealed a significant main effect for prior outcome,
F(2, 72)  3.20, p  .05, and a Prior Outcome  Decision
interaction effect, F(2, 72)  21.32, p  .05. Comparisons of the
relevant means showed that prior-outcome-positive participants
indicated more regret for the active coach than for the passive
coach, F(1, 72)  20.04, p  .05 (the action effect). This pattern
was also present for prior-outcome-absent participants, F(1,
72)  3.84, p  .054. The inaction effect was found for prior-
outcome-negative participants, who indicated that the passive
coach would feel more regret than the active coach, F(1,
72)  20.04, p  .05.
Participants’ answers to the dichotomous question concerning
who felt most regret are presented in Table 1. These data should,
of course, be interpreted with caution, as they were collected after
the continuous regret measure. Nevertheless, the results are virtu-
ally identical to those obtained in Experiment 1 and to the contin-
uous measure in the present experiment. The action effect was
found in the prior-outcome-absent condition, 
2(1, N  25)  6.7,
p  .05, and in the prior-outcome-positive condition, 
2(1, N 
25)  21.16, p  .05. A direct comparison showed that the action
effect was slightly more pronounced in the prior-outcome-positive
condition, p  .05 (N  50, one-sided Fisher exact probability
test). More interesting, however, is the fact that the predicted
inaction effect was found in the prior-outcome-negative condition,

2(1, N  25)  11.56, p  .05. In a direct comparison, the results
differed significantly from those in the other two conditions, 
2s(1,
Ns  50)  18.00, ps  .05.
Relating responsibility to regret: Mediation analysis. A cen-
tral argument of the present article is that the amplification of
regret is due to differences in perceived responsibility. When
people feel highly responsible for an outcome, this should result in
amplified regret. We have argued that prior outcomes can influ-
ence whether people feel more responsible for outcomes caused by
action or by inaction. In other words, effects on perceived respon-
sibility mediate the effects of prior outcomes on the action effect
and inaction effect. The data presented so far are consistent with
this view, but we have not yet provided an adequate test of this
idea.
To test for mediation, we estimated a series of regression models
(cf. Baron & Kenny, 1986). The predictor variable in the models
was the prior outcome manipulation. We effect coded this variable
as follows: If the prior outcome was negative its value was 1, if
it was absent its value was 0, and if it was positive its value was 1.
In this way, the effect-coded predictor ranged from inducing action
(after a negative prior outcome), through a neutral point (when a
prior outcome was absent), to inducing inaction (after a positive
prior outcome).
4 The hypothesized mediator was the difference in
responsibility for the active and inactive coach (a positive value
indicating more responsibility for the active coach). The difference
in regret for the active and inactive coach (a positive value indi-
cating more regret for the active coach) served as the dependent
variable. To examine the degree of mediation, we first regressed
the mediator on the predictor variable (Model 1), then regressed
the dependent variable on the predictor variable (Model 2), then
regressed the dependent variable on the mediator (Model 3), and
finally regressed the dependent variable on both the predictor
variable and the mediator (Model 4). The degree to which the
influence of prior outcome on regret is reduced when one accounts
for the influence of responsibility expresses the degree of media-
tion by responsibility. In case of mediation, the influence of prior
outcomes dropped significantly, and in case of full mediation, the
effect of prior outcomes became nonsignificant.
The results of these regression models are depicted in Figure 1.
The numerical values in this figure are standardized regression
weights. Responsibility clearly mediated the influence of prior
outcomes on regret. Specifically, (a) prior outcomes predicted
responsibility, FModel 1(1, 73)  59.95, regression weight  0.67,
p  .05; (b) prior outcomes predicted regret, FModel 2(1,
73)  39.25, regression weight  0.59, p  .05; (c) responsibility
predicted regret, FModel 3(1, 73)  136.83, regression
weight  0.81, p  .05; and (d) prior outcomes had no predictive
power when we controlled for responsibility, FModel 4(2,
72)  68.80, regression weight between parentheses  0.09, ns.
In further support of our predictions, a regression model in which
prior opponent predicted regret could be improved significantly by
adding responsibility, FModel 4  2(1, 72)  64.31, p  .05,
4 Analyses in which only the prior-outcome-negative and the prior-
outcome-positive conditions or the prior-outcome-negative and prior-
outcome-absent conditions were included showed similar patterns of
results.
Table 2







M SD M SD M SD
Responsibility
Action (Coach Steenland) 4.6a 1.4 4.0a 1.4 3.2b 1.3
Inaction (Coach Straathof) 2.9b 1.2 4.0a 1.6 5.2a 1.0
Regret
Action (Coach Steenland) 5.2a 1.2 4.9a 1.1 2.9b 1.3
Inaction (Coach Straathof) 3.3b 1.3 4.0a 1.6 4.8a 1.6
Note. Entries are mean ratings measured on 7-point scales, with higher
scores indicating more responsibility and more regret. Means within col-
umns that do not share a common subscript differ at p  .05.
318 ZEELENBERG, VAN DEN BOS, VAN DIJK, AND PIETERSwhereas a model in which responsibility predicted regret could not
be improved by adding prior opponent, FModel 4  3(1, 72)  1.
This clearly shows the mediation of responsibility between prior
outcomes and regret.
Discussion
The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate the effects of prior
outcomes on regret following action and inaction and to relate
these effects to perceived responsibility for that particular out-
come. We found the action effect in the conditions in which prior
outcomes were absent or positive. However, replicating the find-
ings of Experiment 1, we found the inaction effect when prior
outcomes were negative. These findings are in accordance with an
explanation of the action effect in terms of perceptions of respon-
sibility, as also shown by the reported mediation analysis.
Experiment 3: Prior Outcomes Exert an Influence Only
When They Are Informative
We have argued that the inaction effect occurs because prior
outcomes may call for action and that this is mostly the case when
they are negative. In some instances, however, even negative prior
outcomes may not be particularly informative. That is, sometimes
prior outcomes do not signal a bad decision, and, hence, there is no
need to take action. Then, action is not more normal than inaction.
For example, when, in our soccer coach paradigm, an amateur
soccer team has lost a game against a professional soccer team,
there may be less need for the coach of the amateur team to
question the strength of his team than after losing to another
amateur team. Following this reasoning, the coach might be in-
clined to change the team after losing to another (essentially
equally strong) amateur team but not after having lost from a much
stronger professional team. Hence, the inaction effect—more re-
gret after not having changed one’s team—should occur after the
team loses to an equally strong amateur team but should not occur
after the team loses to a much stronger professional team. This
hypothesis is examined in Experiment 3.
Method
One hundred students (48 men, 52 women) at Tilburg University,
Tilburg, the Netherlands, participated voluntarily and were randomly as-
signed to one of the two conditions (professional opponent vs. amateur
opponent). Participants in the professional opponent condition read the
following scenario:
The soccer club “Vliestroom Boys” organizes a soccer tournament
with six local amateur soccer teams and two professional soccer teams
that rank high in the national Premier League (namely Feyenoord-
Rotterdam and PSV-Eindhoven). Each team plays several games.
Steenland and Straathof are both coach of an amateur team that
participates in the tournament. Steenland is the coach of Blue-Black
and Straathof is the coach of E.D.O. The teams of both coaches have
played the previous game against one of the two professional teams.
Both the team of Steenland and the team of Straathof lost the previous
game against the professional teams with a large margin.
In the next game, the teams of both coaches play against one of the
other local amateur teams. Steenland, the coach of Blue-Black, de-
cides to do something. He fields three different players. Straathof, the
coach of E.D.O., decides not to change his team. Both teams lose this
game.
The scenario in the amateur opponent condition was exactly the same,
except that the opponents in the first game were two amateur teams instead
of two professional teams. After reading the scenario, participants were
asked to indicate “Who feels more responsible for this outcome?” and
“Who experiences most regret for this outcome?” in both cases followed by
response alternatives: Coach Steenland (who changed his team) or Coach
Straathof (who left his team intact).
Results
The results are depicted in Table 3. This table is set up so that
the results for regret and responsibility can be easily read out, as
well as the relation between these two variables. Therefore, this
table shows per condition (i.e., previous opponent: professional
team vs. amateur team) a 2  2 table with the participants’
responses to the questions “Who is more responsible?” and “Who
feels more regret?” The four cells of each 2  2 table represent the
four different combinations of the answers to the two questions.
That is, when a participant answered that action would result in
more responsibility and also in more regret, he or she ended up in
the upper left cell of the 2  2 table. However, when he or she
answered that action would result in more responsibility but inac-
tion would result in more regret, he or she ended up in the lower
left cell, and so on. The column totals of the 2  2 table represent
the number of people who indicated action and inaction to the
question “Who is more responsible?” and the row totals represent
the answers to the question “Who feels more regret?” We first
describe the findings for responsibility and regret that are shown in
these row and column totals.
The results for responsibility were as expected. In the amateur
opponent condition, the inactive coach was held more responsible
for the defeat by 42 out of the 50 participants, 
2(1, N 
50)  23.12, p  .05, which replicates the inaction effect. In the
professional opponent condition, the inactive and active coaches
were equally often held most responsible for the defeat (22 par-
ticipants indicated that action would be associated with more
responsibility, whereas 28 participants indicated that inaction
would be associated with more responsibility), 
2(1, N 
50)  0.32, ns. A direct comparison between the two conditions
was also significant, 
2(1, N  100)  9.33, p  .05.
The results for regret show a pattern similar to that for respon-
sibility. We expected to replicate the inaction effect in the amateur
opponent condition, because there the prior defeat is meaningful,
but not in the professional opponent condition, because there the
prior defeat carries little information. The inaction effect was
clearly replicated in the amateur opponent condition. The majority
Figure 1. Testing the mediating role of responsibility on regret in Ex-
periment 2. Data are standardized regression weights.
*p  .05.
319 THE INACTION EFFECTof participants believed that inaction results in more regret (38
indicated inaction; 12 indicated action), 
2(1, N  50)  13.52,
p  .05. As expected, no statistically significant difference be-
tween action and inaction was found in the professional opponent
condition (23 participants indicated action; 27 indicated inaction),

2(1, N  50)  0.32, ns. It is important to note that a direct
comparison between the two conditions was also significant, 
2(1,
N  100)  5.32, p  .05.
We now turn to the four cells of the 2  2 tables that are shown
in Table 3. These cells show how the participants’ responses to the
questions concerning responsibility and regret are related. For
example, the 3 in the upper left cell represents the 3 participants in
the amateur team opponent condition who indicated that action
(i.e., Coach Steenland, who took action) would result both in more
responsibility and in more regret. The 5 in the lower left cell
represents the 5 participants in this condition who also indicated
that action would result in more responsibility; however, these
participants indicated that inaction (i.e., Coach Straathof, who did
not take action) would result in more regret. The fact that most
observations are either in the upper left cell or in the lower right
cell demonstrates the strong relation between regret and responsi-
bility. That is, when more responsibility is attributed to inaction (or
action), more regret is also attributed to inaction (or action). The
precise relation between these two variables is addressed in the
next section.
We performed mediation analysis similar to the one performed
for Experiment 2. Because all variables were binary, we estimated
a set of logit regression models (Long, 1997). The predictor
variable in the models was the previous opponent: professional
team (coded 0) or amateur team (coded 1). The hypothesized
mediator was who was feeling more responsible for the defeat: the
coach representing action (coded 0) or the coach representing
inaction (coded 1). The dependent variable was who was experi-
encing more regret: the coach representing action (coded 0) or the
coach representing inaction (coded 1). First, the mediator was
regressed on the predictor variable, next the dependent variable
was regressed on the predictor variable, and finally the dependent
variable was regressed on both the predictor variable and the
mediator. The degree to which the influence of the prior opponent
on regret was reduced when we accounted for the influence of
responsibility expresses the degree of mediation by responsibility.
The results of these regression models are depicted in Figure 2.
The numerical values in this figure and below are logit regression
weights. Responsibility clearly mediates the influence of prior
outcomes on regret. Specifically, (a) prior opponent predicted
responsibility, Model 1
2 (1, N  100)  9.61, regression
weight  1.42, p  .05; (b) prior opponent predicted regret,
Model 2
2 (1, N  100)  5.39, regression weight  0.99, p  .05;
(c) responsibility predicted regret, Model 3
2 (1, N  100)  22.78,
regression weight  2.23, p  .05; and (d) prior opponent had no
predictive power when controlling for responsibility, Model 4
2 (1,
N  100)  23.78, regression weight between parentheses  0.50,
ns. In further support of our predictions, a logit regression model
in which prior opponent predicted regret could be improved sig-
Table 3
Participants’ Answers to the Questions Concerning Who Felt Most Regret and Responsibility
for Both Previous Opponent Conditions (Experiment 3)
Who feels more regret?
Previous opponent
Amateur team Professional team
Who is more responsible? Who is more responsible?
Action Inaction Total Action Inaction Total
Action (Coach Steenland) 3 9 12 18 5 23
Inaction (Coach Straathof) 5 33 38 4 23 27
Total 8 42 22 28
Note. This table shows per condition (i.e., previous opponent: professional team vs. amateur team) a 2  2
table with the participants’ responses to questions “Who is more responsible?” and “Who feels more regret?” Per
condition, the column totals of the 2  2 table show the answers to the question “Who is more responsible?”
and the row totals show the answers to the question “Who feels more regret?” (Thus, in the previous opponent
amateur team condition, 8 participants indicated that action would result in more responsibility, whereas 42
participants indicated that inaction would result in more responsibility; and 12 participants indicated that action
would result in more regret, whereas 38 participants indicated that inaction would result in more regret.) The
entries in the 2  2 tables show how the participants’ responses to the question concerning responsibility and
regret are related. For example, the 3 in the upper left corner represents the 3 participants in the previous
opponent amateur team condition who indicated that action (i.e., Coach Steenland, who took action) would result
in more responsibility and more regret. The entry 5 (directly below the entry 3) represents the 5 participants in
this condition who also indicated that action would result in more responsibility, while they indicated at the same
time that inaction (i.e., Coach Straathof, who did not take action) would result in more regret.
Figure 2. Testing the mediating role of responsibility on regret in Ex-
periment 3: when prior outcomes are uninformative. Data are logit
weights.
*p  .05.
320 ZEELENBERG, VAN DEN BOS, VAN DIJK, AND PIETERSnificantly by adding responsibility, Model 4  2
2 (1, N  100) 
18.39, p  .05, whereas a model in which responsibility pre-
dicted regret could not be improved by adding prior opponent,
Model 4  3
2 (1, N  100)  1.00, ns. This again shows the medi-
ation of responsibility between prior outcomes and regret.
Discussion
These results support our reasoning that if an amateur team loses
to a professional team, the loss provides little information about
the amateur team’s ability, and hence there is no normal course of
action (changing the team or not). But if an amateur team loses to
another amateur team, this provides information that one should
change the team to prevent future losses against other amateur
teams. The results again strongly support that it is not action or
inaction per se that determines the regret that people experience.
Regret is an emotion that is functional in mastering skills and
learning and in attaining a better grasp over decisions. It is espe-
cially salient in situations in which people should have known
better, and not so much when this is not the case. Moreover, the
impact of prior outcomes on regret is mediated by the responsi-
bility for the decision.
Experiment 4: Comparing Action/Inaction Effects for
Regret and Disappointment
In the previous experiments, we focused on effects of action/
inaction on regret. In the present experiment, we extend our focus
and incorporate other emotional reactions to decision outcomes.
We believe that this is an important experiment because in re-
search on effects of action/inaction on emotional reactions, the
dependent variable frequently is not regret but a more general and
nonspecific measure of negative affect. For example, both
Gleicher et al. (1990) and Zeelenberg, Van der Pligt, and De Vries
(2000) confronted participants with action/inaction scenarios and
measured general affective reactions. Gleicher et al. asked partic-
ipants to indicate “who feels worse” (p. 289), and Zeelenberg et al.
asked participants to indicate on an 11-point scale how bad (5)
or good (5) the active and the passive actor felt. More important,
however, in studies directly aimed at regret, the measurement of
the dependent variables has also been quite general. For example,
Landman (1987, see p. 530) reported having asked participants to
indicate “who feels worse.” More recently, Connolly et al. (1997)
investigated regret following action and inaction using an assess-
ment of happiness with the obtained outcome on an 11-point scale
ranging from 5( very unhappy)t o5( very happy).
We question whether these indirect measures teach us some-
thing about the psychology of regret. Put differently, when inter-
ested in regret, can we learn something by measuring related
affective states? Recent research on the causes and consequences
of specific emotions shows that one cannot simply assume that
different emotions respond in the same way to identical manipu-
lations, and, hence, this research stresses the need for emotion-
specific theorizing (DeSteno et al., 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001;
Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998).
It seems worthwhile in this respect to differentiate between
regret and disappointment, two important emotions people may
experience after action/inaction decisions that go awry. Like re-
gret, disappointment can be described as a feeling of negative
affect. Indeed, on first sight, these emotions have a lot in common.
They have both been called counterfactual emotions, both have
negative valence, both are common experiences, and both are the
result of decisions with unfortunate outcomes (Landman, 1993;
Loomes & Sugden, 1982, 1987; Roese, 1997; Roese & Olson,
1997; Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 1998;
Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 2000). On the
basis of these similarities, one might be tempted to expect similar
results for regret and disappointment.
However, we emphasize that regret and disappointment are not
identical emotions and that the relation between prior outcomes
and action/inaction effects may be different for both types of
emotions. Previous research revealed that disappointment and re-
gret do differ with regard to the experiential content (Zeelenberg,
Van Dijk, Manstead, & Van der Pligt, 1998), the way they are
evoked (Van Dijk, Van der Pligt, & Zeelenberg, 1999; Zeelenberg,
Van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998), and the different behavioral con-
sequences these two emotions may produce (Zeelenberg & Pieters,
1999). As Landman (1993) has argued, “an essential difference is
disappointment’s, and not regret’s, dependence on expectations
(estimated probabilities) of various outcomes” (p. 47; see also Van
Dijk & Van der Pligt, 1997). Experiments 1–3 of the current article
inform us about the effects of manipulations of action/inaction and
prior outcomes on regret. What can we expect for disappointment?
Instead of predicting that these manipulations have similar effects
on regret and disappointment, we predicted marked differences.
Because disappointment results from outcomes that fall below
expectations, it is important, we argue, to consider the effects of
prior outcomes on expectations. We propose that manipulations of
prior outcomes and action/inaction interact to affect expectations
and, consequently, ratings of disappointment. For our soccer coach
paradigm, we therefore predicted that participants in the prior-
outcome-negative condition would report more disappointment
after action than after inaction. After all, when a prior game was
lost, expectations of winning the next game will not be high.
Taking action to prevent further losses, however, may increase
expectations, which causes disappointment following a loss to be
more intense than it would be in the case of inaction. In a similar
vein, we predicted expectations in the prior-outcome-positive con-
dition to be influenced by the outcome of the prior game. After
having won the prior game, expectations of winning the next game
should be high. Taking action, changing the winning team, should
decrease expectations. Losing the next game should then result in
less disappointment compared with losing the game following
inaction. Because the prior-outcome-absent condition did not con-
tain information about the prior game on which expectations could
be based, we had no a priori prediction about whether in this
condition action or inaction would result in more disappointment.
Thus, the primary goal of this experiment, apart from replicating
the main findings of Experiments 1–3, is to demonstrate that it is
important to be specific about the emotion under investigation. As
we have detailed above, we believe it is crucial to ask for specific
ratings of that particular emotion, as action/inaction manipulations
may result in completely opposite effects for different emotions.
Method
One hundred fifty students at Tilburg University (87 men, 63 women)
participated voluntarily and were paid for their participation. They were
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absent vs. negative). Participants first read the part of the scenario that
introduced the two soccer teams and the results they obtained during the
last game (the prior outcome), after which they read about the decisions of
both soccer coaches for action and inaction. Then they were asked the
following question to investigate the effects of action/inaction on their
expectations: “Which coach has the highest expectation of winning the
game of this Sunday?” After participants answered this question, they read
on a subsequent page that both teams lost the Sunday game. Subsequently,
they were asked, “Which coach feels more responsible for this outcome?”
“Who feels more regret?” and “Who feels more disappointment?”
Results and Discussion
The results are depicted in Table 4. This table is set up similarly
to Table 3, so that the results for regret and responsibility, and the
results for disappointment and expectations, can be seen separately
(in the row and column totals) as well as the relation between these
variables (in the cells of the different 2  2 tables).
Responsibility and regret. The upper panel of Table 4 displays
the results for regret and the hypothesized mediator responsibility.
The results for responsibility were as expected. The active coach
was judged as more responsible in the prior-outcome-absent con-
dition (38 chose action vs. 12 chose inaction), 
2(1, N 
50)  13.52, p  .05, and in the prior-outcome-positive condition
(48 chose action vs. 2 chose inaction), 
2(1, N  50)  42.32, p 
.05. A comparison of these two conditions showed that this effect
was more pronounced in the latter condition, 
2(1, N 
100)  8.31, p  .05. It is important to note that in the prior-
outcome-negative condition the effect was reversed, such that the
inactive coach was judged to be more responsible than the active
coach (18 chose action vs. 32 chose inaction), 
2(1, N 
50)  3.92, p  .05, which is consistent with the inaction effect.
The results in this condition differed significantly from those
obtained in the other two conditions, 
2s(1, Ns  100)  16, ps 
.05.
The results for regret mimic the findings of the earlier experi-
ments (see also Table 1) and are in line with those for responsi-
bility. The action effect was found in the prior-outcome-absent
condition. Participants indicated that Coach Steenland (action)
would feel more regret than would Coach Straathof (inaction; 41
chose action vs. 9 chose inaction), 
2(1, N  50)  20.48, p  .05.
This effect was slightly more pronounced (but not significantly so)
in the prior-outcome-positive condition (44 chose action vs. 6
chose inaction), 
2(1, N  50)  28.88, p  .05. In the prior-
outcome-negative condition, however, the effect was reversed.
Participants reported that the inactive coach would feel more regret
than active coach (18 chose action vs. 32 chose inaction), 
2(1,
N  50)  3.92, p  .05. This condition again differed signifi-
cantly from the other two, 
2s(1, Ns  100)  21.00, ps  .05.
Expectations and disappointment. The lower panel of Table 4
displays the results for disappointment and the hypothesized me-
diator expectations. The results for expectations are in line with
our predictions. We reasoned that, overall, the expectations would
be low in the prior-outcome-negative condition, as the teams lost
the prior match. Changing the team (i.e., action) was expected to
elevate expectations. Indeed, participants in this condition indi-
cated that the expectations for the active coach would be higher
(39 chose action vs. 11 chose inaction), 
2(1, N  50)  15.68,
p  .05. We also reasoned that, overall, the expectations would be
high following a prior victory (i.e., in the prior-outcome-positive
condition) and that these would be decreased by taking action,
Table 4
Participants’ Answers to the Questions Concerning Regret and Responsibility (Top Half) and Disappointment and Expectations
(Bottom Half) for Each of the Three Prior Outcome Conditions (Experiment 4)
Who feels more regret?
Prior outcome
Positive Absent Negative
Who is more responsible? Who is more responsible? Who is more responsible?
Action Inaction Total Action Inaction Total Action Inaction Total
Action (Coach Steenland) 44 0 44 34 7 41 12 6 18
Inaction (Coach Straathof) 4 2 6 4 5 9 6 26 32
Total 48 2 38 12 18 32
Who feels more disappointment?
Who had higher expectations? Who had higher expectations? Who had higher expectations?
Action Inaction Total Action Inaction Total Action Inaction Total
Action (Coach Steenland) 7 13 20 15 14 29 31 6 37
Inaction (Coach Straathof) 5 25 30 2 19 21 8 5 13
Total 12 38 17 33 39 11
Note. This table shows per condition (i.e., prior outcome: positive vs. absent vs. negative) a 2  2 table within the top half the participants’ responses
to questions “Who is more responsible?” and “Who feels more regret?” and in the bottom half the participants’ responses to questions “Who had higher
expectations?” and “Who feels more disappointment?” In the top half, the column totals of each 2  2 table show the answers to the question “Who is
more responsible?” and the row totals show the answers to the question “Who feels more regret?” The entries in the 2  2 tables in the top half show how
the participants’ responses to the question concerning responsibility and regret are related. In the bottom half, the column totals show the answer to the
question “Who had higher expectations?” and the row totals show the answers to the question “Who feels more disappointment?” The entries in the 2  2
tables in the bottom half show how the participants’ responses to the question concerning expectations and disappointment are related.
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found (12 chose action vs. 38 chose inaction), 
2(1, N 
50)  13.52, p  .05. We had no predictions for the prior-
outcome-absent condition. The results show that participants indi-
cated higher expectations following inaction (17 chose action
vs. 33 chose inaction), 
2(1, N  50)  5.12, p  .05.
The results for disappointment were as expected and, hence,
very different from the results for regret. In the prior-outcome-
positive condition, participants indicated more disappointment fol-
lowing inaction, albeit not significantly so (20 chose action vs. 30
chose inaction), 
2(1, N  50)  2.00, ns. Participants in the
prior-outcome-negative condition indicated more disappointment
following action (37 chose action vs. 13 chose inaction), 
2(1, N 
50)  11.52, p  .05. Note that for these two conditions the effects
are completely opposite to what was found for regret. Participants
in the prior-outcome-absent condition indicated more disappoint-
ment following action than following inaction, but this difference
was not significant (29 chose action vs. 21 chose inaction), 
2(1,
N  50)  1.28, ns.
Relating responsibility to regret and expectations to disappoint-
ment: Mediation analysis. Next, we examined the mediation
effect of responsibility on regret and of expectations on disappoint-
ment (see Figure 3), again by estimating sets of logit regression
models (Long, 1997). The predictor variable in the models was the
prior outcome manipulation. As in Experiment 2, this variable was
effect coded: If the prior outcome was negative its value was 1,
if it was absent its value was 0, and if it was positive its value
was 1.
The results for regret are reported first (logit regression weights
and p values). As expected, responsibility mediated the influence
of prior outcome on regret. Specifically, the analyses showed that
(a) prior outcomes predicted responsibility, Model 1
2 (1, N 
150)  47.59, regression weight  1.82, p  .05; (b) prior
outcomes predicted regret, Model 2
2 (1, N  150)  34.03, regres-
sion weight  1.43, p  .05; (c) responsibility predicted regret,
Model 3
2 (1, N  150)  49.57, regression weight  2.79, p  .05;
(d) the influence of prior outcomes on regret was reduced by
almost half when responsibility was accounted for, although it still
remained significant, Model 4
2 (2, N  150)  56.78, regression
weight  0.84, p  .05. In further correspondence with these
findings, a logit regression model in which responsibility predicted
regret could be improved by adding the prior outcome variable,
Model 4  2
2 (1, N  150)  7.21, p  .05, whereas a model in
which the prior outcome variable predicted regret could be im-
proved to a much larger extent by adding responsibility, Model 4  3
2
(1, N  150)  22.75, p  .05. This shows the, in this case partial,
mediation of responsibility between prior outcomes and regret.
The results for disappointment are reported next. As we antic-
ipated, expectations mediated the influence of prior outcome on
disappointment. The results show that (a) prior outcomes predicted
expectations, Model 1
2 (1, N  150)  31.09, regression
weight  1.22, p  .05; (b) prior outcomes predicted disappoint-
ment, Model 2
2 (1, N  150)  12.07, regression weight  0.73,
p  .05; (c) expectations predicted disappointment, Model 3
2 (1,
N  150)  22.41, regression weight  1.66, p  .05; and (d) the
influence of prior outcomes on disappointment was insignificant
when expectations were accounted for, Model 4
2 (2, N  150) 
25.17, regression weight  0.40, ns. In further support of our
predictions, a logit regression model in which the prior outcome
variable predicted disappointment could be improved significantly
by adding expectations, Model 4  2
2 (1, N  150)  13.01, p 
.05, whereas a model in which expectations predicted disappoint-
ment could not be improved by adding the prior outcome variable,
Model 4  2
2 (1, N  150)  2.76, ns. This shows the mediation of
expectations between prior outcomes and disappointment.
The case for the influence of responsibility on regret (but not on
disappointment) and for expectations on disappointment (but not
on regret) was strengthened in two final logit regression analyses.
In the first analysis, regret was predicted from the prior outcome
variable and responsibility as well as from expectations. As ex-
pected, the responsibility variable was significant in this analysis,
model-
2(3, N  150)  56.92, regression weight  2.24, p  .05,
but the expectations variable was not (regression weight  0.19,
p  .5). In the second analysis, disappointment was predicted from
the prior outcome variable and expectations as well as from
responsibility. As we anticipated, the expectations variable was
significant in this analysis, model-
2(3, N  150)  25.21, re-
gression weight  1.38, p  .05, but the responsibility variable
was not (regression weight  0.10, p  .5).
This experiment reveals, as do the previous ones, that the effects
of action/inaction on counterfactual emotions are very much con-
tingent on what is known about prior outcomes. More important,
the present experiment also shows that the effects of action/
inaction may be very different for regret and disappointment. This
noteworthy finding corroborates both our view that it is important
to be specific in theoretical and operational terms about the emo-
tion under investigation and our claims about the restricted gen-
eralizability of the action effect.
General Discussion
The data presented in this article show that the action effect is
not as robust as has been suggested by the overwhelming amount
of replications reported in previous articles. The main difference
between previous studies on the action effect and our current
approach is that previous studies tended to concentrate on isolated
decisions, whereas we studied sequences of decisions. From a
theoretical standpoint, the notion of sequential decisions has gen-
erated new insights on the occurrence of action effects. In partic-
Figure 3. Testing the mediating role of responsibility on regret and
expectations on disappointment in Experiment 4. Data are logit weights.
*p  .05.
323 THE INACTION EFFECTular, our results suggest that, depending on the valence of prior
outcomes, inaction may result in more regret than action; that is, a
reversal of “the clearest and most frequently replicated finding”
(Gilovich & Medvec, 1995, p. 380) in the regret domain. From a
practical standpoint, one could argue that our current approach
more closely resembles reality, in which decisions are rarely made
in isolation. Instead, decisions usually follow on previous out-
comes and decisions.
We regard it as telling that these findings are derived from
experiments that, with the exception of the notion of prior out-
comes, stay very close in methodology to the original work by
Kahneman and Tversky (1982; cf. Kahneman, 1995). That is,
participants were confronted with a scenario in which two persons
arrive at the same negative outcome. One person arrives at this
outcome after a decision to act, and the other person arrives at the
same outcome through a decision not to act.
It is not only in terms of methodology that our current research
builds on Kahneman and Tversky’s (1982) pioneering work.
Throughout the article, we relate our insights to the notion of
normality in the sense that, like Kahneman and Tversky, we
postulate that regret after abnormal decisions may be more ex-
treme than after normal decisions. The innovative part of our
approach is that we reason that normality of action and inaction
may be dependent on prior outcomes. In the current article, we
manipulated normality of actions and inactions by having partic-
ipants read information about prior outcomes. This manipulation
was inspired in part by research on the “win stay–lose change”
heuristic and on consumer brand switching, which suggests that
people mainly act when prior outcomes are negative (e.g., Macy,
1995; Tellis & Geath, 1990). In the present experiments, the prior
outcome was the outcome of the soccer game a team played the
previous week. Consistent with predictions, we found that when
the prior game was won or when there was no information about
the prior game, participants reported that the coach who acted
would feel more regret than would the coach who did not act.
When the prior game was lost, participants indicated that the coach
who acted would feel less regret than would the coach who did not
act. The active coach at least tried to prevent further losses,
whereas the inactive coach did nothing.
The finding that people regret negative outcomes that were
caused by inactions more than they regret equally negative out-
comes caused by actions when these outcomes were preceded by
another negative outcome is consistent with an explanation of the
action effect in terms of perceived responsibility. More support for
this explanation was found in Experiments 2–4, in which analyses
show mediation for perceived responsibility in the case of regret.
Other findings from these experiments are also consistent with this
reasoning.
It is appropriate to note that although we focus exclusively on
the effects of prior outcomes, our point is actually much broader.
5
Our manipulations of past outcomes are merely a vehicle to
influence the normality of the actions that could produce regret. As
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and Kahneman and Miller (1986)
argued, it is the normality of these behaviors that amplify the
regret. We aim to show that in cases in which action is called for,
unfortunate failures to act produce more regret. Action can be
called for by negative prior outcomes, as we currently argue, but
also by other factors, such as the social roles of some professions
in which it is the person’s job to act. Fire fighters, for example, are
supposed to act in case of a fire and try to prevent bad things from
happening. When they fail to act in these situations, they probably
experience more regret and receive greater blame than do those
who acted ineffectively. In other words, our current focus on the
effects of prior outcomes is subordinate to the higher principle of
normality.
Scenario-Based Versus Real-Life Regrets
The existence of an inaction effect and its interpretation in terms
of perceived responsibility might also offer an explanation for
Gilovich and Medvec’s (1994, Study 5) failure to replicate the
action/inaction finding for short-term real-life regrets. Gilovich
and Medvec asked respondents to recall their single most regret-
table action and inaction from the past week. Respondents indi-
cated that they regretted recent actions as often as recent inactions.
In a recent extension of this study, Feldman, Miyamoto, and Loftus
(1999) asked participants about the intensity of both action and
inaction regrets, and they also found that in real life these are
equally intense. These findings thus contradict the earlier studies
showing the action effect. Why is it that the most frequently
replicated finding in scenario studies was not replicated in surveys
of real-life regrets?
The answer might be related to the discrepancy between
scenario-based and real-life regrets (see also Feldman et al., 1999).
As we argue in this article, regret stems from the realization that an
alternative course of action would have been better and from
feelings of responsibility for the current outcome. Thus, regret
arising from self-recrimination or self-blame is most pronounced
when the decision was unreasonable, inexplicable, or indefensible
(cf. Sugden, 1985). In the typical scenario study, participants learn
about choices other people make and the outcomes associated with
these actions without learning about the possible reasons why
these people opt for action or inaction. In the Gilovich and Medvec
(1994) and Feldman et al. (1999) surveys, respondents focused on
their own real-life regrets. These respondents probably knew why
they had chosen the regretted action or inaction and could probably
explain these choices. Hence, there is no a priori reason to expect
that the decisions not to act in these real-life samples were more
explicable and defensible and thus associated with less responsi-
bility than the decisions to act. This might explain why actions and
inactions were equally regretted.
Thus, the findings of Gilovich and Medvec (1994) and of
Feldman et al. (1999) can easily be accounted for in our reasoning.
Of course, whether this explanation is valid cannot be determined
on the basis of our data, and this is not the main focus of our
investigation. Our main aim is to demonstrate the potential effects
of prior outcomes on experienced regret and, more generally, to
draw attention to the potential benefits of studying regret effects in
a chain of events and decisions. By taking this into account and
putting this notion at the heart of theorizing, one not only stays
closer to the way decisions are embedded in reality but, as the
current results indicate, one may also generate new and challeng-
ing findings.
5 We thank an anonymous reviewer for stimulating us to address the
more general implications of our theorizing.
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grets is the fact that participants in scenario studies do not actually
experience regret but rather make predictions about what others,
given a particular set of circumstances, might experience. Hence,
given this projective nature of our findings, we have to be cautious
in drawing conclusions about actual regret experiences and their
behavioral implications. We have reasons to believe, however, that
the current findings provide valuable insights into the psychology
of regret. First, even when one has serious doubts about the
correspondence between these imagined regrets and actual expe-
rienced regrets, one has to acknowledge that our data provide
insights into what people anticipate regretting later on (cf. Con-
nolly et al., 1997). These anticipated regrets have been shown to
impact behavioral choice (for reviews, see Mellers, 2000; Zeelen-
berg, 1999). Second, many of the regret research findings, most of
which are cited in this article, have been replicated using a whole
range of methodologies, including scenario studies and recalled
life experiences. In what follows, we assume sufficient correspon-
dence between scenario-based regret and real-life regrets to spec-
ulate about the implications of our findings for the dynamics of
regret.
Regret in the Action Sequence
Our findings thus suggest that it is worthwhile to shift attention
to situations in which actions are not made in isolation but instead
are embedded in an action sequence. When one thinks further
along this line, the findings also draw attention to possible effects
of experienced regret on subsequent behavior.
Although there is a large, emerging stream of research on the
antecedents and consequences of anticipated regret in decision
making, few studies have examined the more dynamic aspects of
regret (cf. Zeelenberg et al., 2001). For example, what is the
influence of the experience of regret on subsequent decisions, how
can it moderate intention–choice relationships, and, more gener-
ally, what is regret’s role in causing behavior? In a review of the
role of feelings in the action sequence, Schwartz and Bohner
(1996, p. 128) concluded that empirical research is mostly related
to predecision and preaction processes such as determination of
goal desirability and categorization of alternatives. Such research
has emphasized the diagnostic function that global, environmen-
tally induced moods such as happiness or sadness have in people’s
cognitive processes. Although emotion research has established
that specific negative emotions such as regret, disappointment,
fear, and anger are accompanied by very different thoughts, feel-
ings, action tendencies, and goals (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman,
Wiest, & Swartz, 1994), research on the role of specific emotions
in the action and postaction phases is virtually absent.
Our present series of studies suggests that the specific emotion
of regret is highly sensitive to prior outcomes and that these prior
outcomes signal the need for action or inaction. Taking this per-
spective, one may argue that the emotion regret is informative with
regard to the current status of individuals’ goals (Lecci, Okun, &
Karoly, 1994) and may result in a focus on nonattained goals and,
consequently, promote goal persistence. Thus, regret can be
viewed as a goal-directed emotion (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, &
Pieters, 1998; Bagozzi, Baumgartner, Pieters, & Zeelenberg,
2000), able to influence the expenditure of effort during the action
phase. This implies that experiences of regret may strongly affect
people’s behaviors. In the future, researchers may want to examine
more closely the role of regret experiences in goal striving and
goal-directed behavior. For instance, it seems valuable to gain
insight into the effects of regret on self-protective behaviors. There
is evidence for beneficial effects of anticipated regret on self-
protection (Richard, Van der Pligt & De Vries, 1996; Josephs,
Larrick, Steele, & Nisbett, 1992), but it is not yet clear whether and
how the experience of the emotion itself, rather than its anticipa-
tion, may influence behaviors.
How does this relate to action and inaction regrets? It is
interesting that research on inaction inertia (Tykocinski & Pitt-
man, 1998) suggests that regrets over inaction may reduce the
likelihood that one acts on a subsequent opportunity that is still
attractive but less attractive than the one missed earlier. How-
ever, we argue that the opposite may happen when the new
opportunity is more attractive than the missed one. In that case,
the regret experienced over the failure to act may promote
action to be taken on the new opportunity. Similarly, action
regrets may cause one to act more prudently in the future and,
hence, their effect can be seen as inhibiting behavior, but
research on consumer regrets has shown that the experience of
regret promotes switching behavior (Tsiros & Mittal, 2000;
Zeelenberg & Pieters, 1999; Zeelenberg et al., 2001). Future
research should investigate the conditions under which action
and inaction regrets are mobilizing or paralyzing.
However, to return to the concept that motivates the research we
report here, compared with previous studies, the findings of the
present article tell us something that is fundamental with regard to
the psychology of regret. The present findings show that prior
decision outcomes influence people’s attributions of feelings of
regret following action and inaction. What is especially interesting
about the current findings is that they suggest that negative prior
decision outcomes can promote action tendencies and, hence, may
make people regret inaction more than action. In this way, the
present article explores the inaction effect in the psychology of
regret.
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